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INTRODUCTION

As a wave of foreclosures sweeps across the nation, black and Hispanic
families are seeing billions in accumulated housing wealth evaporate as a
consequence of their overrepresentation in the high cost, high risk subprime
mortgage sector. While the mortgage market after the crisis will never be the
same as it was, price discrimination will endure, as will the essential and as yet
unfulfilled goal of fair lending laws-ensuring that minority families can
borrow on equal terms with white families.
In the contemporary United States mortgage loan market, the predominant
fair lending issue is no longer denial of loan applications; it is instead the fact
that minority homeowners pay much more in interest rates and are much more
likely to get risky subprime mortgages that lead to foreclosure. 2 On the one
hand, minority homebuyers and homeowners still have less collateral and
weaker credit history than whites. 3 On the other hand, time after time, studies
have controlled for those variables and found that objective credit qualifications
cannot explain away the racial price gap.4
The mortgage industry protests that in the past decade automated
underwriting has removed the human factor and, hence, the possibility to
discriminate. Loan applicants, appraisers, and credit bureaus provide mortgage
application information that is entered into a computerized underwriting model.
The underwriting model generates both an approval decision and a price
(interest rate, fees, etc.). Racial disparities that remain, the industry argues, must
be the product of legitimate cost-based considerations.
There are at least three reasons why this benign story turns out to be false.
First, lenders do not put all mortgage applicants through the same underwriting
and pricing analysis. Instead, they use different pricing structures by dividing

1. AMAAD RIVERA ET AL., FORECLOSED: STATE OF THE DREAM 2008, at vii (2008),
available at http://www.faireconomy.org/files/pdf/StateOfDream 01 16 08 Web.pdf (estimating
wealth loss to people of color from subprime foreclosures at $164 to $214 billion).
2. See William Apgar & Allegra Calder, The Dual Mortgage Market: The Persistence of
Discriminationin Mortgage Lending, in THE GEOGRAPHY OF OPPORTUNITY: RACE AND HOUSING
CHOICE IN METROPOLITAN AMERICA 101 (Xavier de Souza Briggs ed., 2005).
3. See infra text accompanying notes 52-65 (discussing the Courchane paper).
4. See discussion infra Part II.B.2.
5. MORTGAGE BANKERS ASS'N, SUITABILITY-DON'T TURN BACK THE CLOCK ON FAIR
LENDING AND HOMEOWNERSHIP GAINS 15-16 (2007), http://www.mortgagebankers.org/files/

News/InternalResource/48134_Suitability-DontTurnBacktheClockonFairLendingandHomeowner
shipGains.pdf
6. See id. at l6.
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applications among different business channels and product groups. 7 Minority
applicants are overrepresented in higher priced channels and loan product
categories and as customers of higher priced lenders. Second, pricing is not
purely computer-generated because mortgage brokers retain the discretion to
increase interest rates to certain borrowers in order to increase the brokers'
compensation.8 Third, the pricing models benefit and penalize borrowers
through a series of adjustments to a base interest rate, and these adjustments are
not necessarily tied directly and measurably
to the lender's underlying costs for
9
losses.
credit
and
servicing,
origination,
Fair lending law, including regulations and bank supervisor examining
guidelines, must take account of this new terrain in the mortgage market.
Disparate impact analysis, properly and rigorously applied, could help reduce
the price discrimination that is partly responsible for the persisting
homeownership wealth gaps between blacks and whites in the United States.
In Part II of this Article, I review the significance of mortgage pricing to
minority homeowners. I also examine the research on disparities in loan
approval and loan pricing and whether the disparities represent discrimination.
In Part III, I explain in detail how mortgage pricing works and how it
disadvantages minorities. Finally, in Part IV, I advocate for application of fair
lending laws to price discrimination using a disparate impact test that takes
account of lender steering of minorities into different products, lender
delegation of pricing discretion to brokers, and lender use of risk-based pricing
of dubious validity that may not accurately reflect credit risk and costs.
II.

BLACKS AND HiSPANICS PAY MORE FOR MORTGAGES

A.

The Wealth Gap and the Importance ofInterest Rates

Blacks and Hispanics still arrive at the economic starting line far behind
their white counterparts because of the persistent and large wealth gap in
America. In 2004, the median nonwhite or Hispanic household had a net worth
of $24,800; in comparison, non-Hispanic whites had a net worth of $140,700, a
ratio of nearly 6:1. The wealth gap is much wider than the gap in incomes,

7. See discussion infra Part lIl.A.
8. See discussion infra Part IlI.C.
9. See discussion infra Part IlI.D.
10. Brian K. Bucks, Arthur B. Kennickell & Kevin B. Moore, Recent Changes in U.S.
Family Finances: Evidence from the 2001 and 2004 Survey of Consumer Finances, FED. RES.
BULL., (Fed. Reserve Bd., Wash., D.C.), Mar. 22, 2006, at A], A8 tbl.3, available at
http://www. federalreserve.gov/pubs/bulletin/2006/financesurvey.pdf
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which was roughly 2:1 in 2004.11 29.4% of black families have zero or negative
net worth, compared with 13.0% of white families. 12
The smaller wealth endowment of minority families is also much more
concentrated in home values and equity. 13 The availability of mortgages
obviously limits opportunities even to begin acquiring home wealth. More
importantly in the contemporary market, mortgage terms have a huge impact on
wealth accumulation. A higher interest rate will delay wealth accumulation and
reduce the home value that a family can acquire, diverting more income towards
interest and away from debt reduction.' 4 In addition, nontraditional loan terms,
some of which allow for payment of interest only or even negative amortization,
completely defeat the goal of wealth accumulation. Finally, aggressive selling
of cash-out refinancing mortgages prevents wealth growth by promoting
continual draining of what little equity the borrower accumulates. Thus, to
reduce the wealth gap, minority homeowners need mortgage products that are
inexpensive and fully amortizing.
B. Data and Research on Loan Approval and PricingDisparities
The touchstone for any discussion of race discrimination in lending
decisions is known as the Boston Fed study. 15The Boston Fed study advanced
previous lending discrimination research by controlling for a comprehensive set
of variables including borrower credit history, income, assets and loan
features. 16 The study found that minority applicants had 8.2% higher denial
rates than comparable white applicants among Boston lenders in 1990.17
Although the study has been debated and critiqued extensively, its findings have

11. Edward N. Wolff, Recent Trends in Household Wealth in the United States: Rising Debt
and the Middle-Class Squee e 27 tbl.9 (Levy Econ. Inst. of Bard Coll. & Dep't of Econ., N.Y.
Univ., Working Paper No. 502, 2007), availableathttp://www.levy.org/pubs/wp_502.pdf
12. Id.
13. See Kathleen C. Engel & Patricia A. McCoy, From Credit Denialto PredatoryLending:
The Challenge of SustainingMinority Homeownership, in SEGREGATION: THE RISING COSTS FOR
AMERICA 81, 82 (James H. Carr & Nandinee K. Kutty eds., 2008).
14. The higher the interest rate, the higher the monthly payment for a given loan amount
will be. Thus, if a family's monthly payment is the limiting factor, a higher interest rate means a
lower loan amount. As an example of the effect a higher rate has on principal repayment, it will
take a borrower 17.5 years to reduce a $100,000 mortgage (financed at 12% calculated on a 30year amortization) to $80,000. However, a borrower with the same mortgage at 6% will reach the
same principal in 11.7 years and after 17.5 years will pay down the mortgage to less than $64,000.
15. See Alicia H. Munnell et al., Mortgage Lending in Boston: InterpretingHMDA Data, 86
AM. ECON. REV. 25 (1996).

16.
17.

Seeid. at38.
Seeid. at33.
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held up to the most rigorous scrutiny. 8 More recent studies have extended the
findings of the Boston Fed study and confirmed that unexplained disparities in
approval rates persist. 9
Various explanations have been offered for the higher likelihood of equally
qualified minority applicants being denied a mortgage. Marginally qualified
white borrowers are more likely to receive coaching and advice on how to
improve their credit qualifications, while loan officers simply turn away
20
comparable minority applicants.
Other forms of stereotyping and self2
'
play.
at
be
also
may
selection
In the mid-1990s, attention shifted to the emerging subprime mortgage
market, which offered loans with lower underwriting standards and higher
interest rates and fees. In 2000, concerns about predatory lending in the
subprime market led the Treasury Department and the Department of Housing
and Urban Development (HUD) to hold joint hearings and to issue a report that
found that, among other things, minority homeowners were disproportionately
concentrated in the new subprime sector and paying higher rates as a result.
From this point, the attention of fair lending research shifted from looking at
mortgage loan denials to looking at the concentration of minority borrowers in
the emerging subprime sector of the mortgage market. A number of other
studies confirmed the disparity, usually by identifying subprime loans in data
reported under the Home Mortgage Disclosure Act (HMDA) 23 based on the
lender's presence on HUD's list of subprime lenders. 24 Even controlling for
credit characteristics, it seemed minority borrowers were significantly more
likely to get loans from subprime lenders and, by inference, to pay higher prices
for home credit. 25 The incorporation of pricing data into HMDA allowed price
discrimination to be measured directly.

18. See STEPHEN L. Ross & JOHN YINGER, THE COLOR OF CREDIT: MORTGAGE
DISCRIMINATION, RESEARCH METHODOLOGY, AND FAIR-LENDING ENFORCEMENT 107-67
(2002).
19. Seeid. at216-19.
20. See id.
21. George C. Galster, Research on Discrimination in Housing and Mortgage Markets:
Assessment and Future Directions,3 HOUSING POL'Y DEBATE 639, 644-45 (1992).
22. See U.S. DEP'T OF HOUS. & URBAN DEV. & U.S. DEP'T OF TREASURY,
RECOMMENDATIONS TO CURB PREDATORY HOME MORTGAGE LENDING (2000), available at

http://www.hud.gov/library/bookshelfl 2/pressrel/treasrpt.pdf
23. 12 U.S.C. §§ 2801-2810 (2006).
24. E.g., Paul S. Calem, Jonathan E. Hershaff & Susan M. Wachter, Neighborhood Patterns
of Subprime Lending: Evidence from Disparate Cities, 15 HOUSING POL'Y DEBATE 603, 608, 620
(2004) (finding that minority status is significantly related to subprime borrowing).
25. See Robert B. Avery et al., New Information Reported Under HMDA and Its Application
in Fair Lending Enforcement, FED. RES. BULL. (Fed. Reserve Bd., Wash., D.C.), Summer 2005, at
344, 374 [hereinafter 2004 HMDA Data], available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/pubs/
bulletin/2005 /summer05 hmda.pdf
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1. HMDA Price Datafor 2004-2007
HMDA and Regulation C26 require banks and mortgage companies to
report data to a federal agency on every mortgage application they receive. The
Federal Reserve amended Regulation C in 2002, effective beginning with 2004
reports, to require that lenders report not only whether they approved or denied
an application
but also whether they assigned higher interest rates to approved
17
loans. Lenders do
not report interest rates for all mortgages, but only for those
28
threshold.
a
above
Beginning with HMDA reports for 2004, mortgage lenders had to report the
annual percentage rate (APR) charged for each first mortgage with an APR
that is more than 3% above the comparable Treasury rate and for each junior
mortgage with an APR that is more than 5% above the comparable Treasury
rate. For example, as of June 24, 2005, the 20-year Treasury rate was at 4.3%0,
and the average prime mortgage rate was around 5.6%. 31 Hence, a lender would
have to report the APR on a first mortgage with an APR greater than 7.3% in
2005 HMDA reports.
The Federal Reserve intended reporting thresholds for high rate loans to
identify subprime mortgages. 32 Loans with higher rates constituted 15.5% of all
33
approved mortgages in 2004 and 26.2% of all approved mortgages in 2005;
the rates then rose to 28.7% in 2006 and fell back to 18.3%
34 in 2007, partly as a
result of the subprime crisis and failure of several lenders.
The price data reveal disturbing racial disparities in the granting of high
interest mortgages. In 2004, 32.4% of all first lien mortgages made to black
borrowers were higher rate (i.e., subprime) compared with 8.7% for non-

26. 12 C.F.R. §§ 203.1-203.6 (2008).
27. Id. § 203.4(a)(12); see Robert B. Avery et al., Higher-Priced Home Lending and the
2005 HMDA Data, FED. RES. BULL. (Fed. Reserve Bd., Wash., D.C.), Sept. 8, 2006, at A123,
A123-24 [hereinafter 2005 HMDA Data], available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/pubs/
bulletin/2006/hmda/bull06hmda.pdf
28. 2005 HMDA Data, supranote 27, at A124.
29. The Truth in Lending Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1606(a) (2006), and the Federal Reserve Board's
Regulation Z, 12 C.F.R. § 226.22(a)(1) (2008), define APR. The APR for mortgages is typically
higher than the interest rate because it treats all prepaid finance charges (lender points and broker
fees) as reductions in the loan principal. See id. § 226.18(b).
30. 12 C.F.R. § 203.4(a)(12).
31.

BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE SYS., STATISTICAL RELEASE H. 15 (2005),

availableat http://www. federalreserve.gov/releases/h 15/20050627/h 15.pdf
32. 2005 HMDA Data, supranote 27, at A124.
33. Id. atA144.
34. Robert B. Avery et al., The 2007 HMDA Data, FED. RES. BULL. (Fed. Reserve Bd.,
Wash., D.C.), Dec. 23, 2008, at A107, A121 [hereinafter 2007 HMDA Data], available at
http://www.federalreserve.gov/pubs/bulletin/2008/pdf/hmda07final.pdf
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Hispanic whites. 35 Blacks were thus four times as likely as whites to pay
subprime rates on their mortgage loans. Similar disparities show up in
subsequent years' reports. 36 For example, in the first half of 2007, 31.8% of
mortgages to Hispanic whites were higher priced, while
37 only 11.8% of
mortgages made to non-Hispanic whites were higher priced.
2.

Efforts to Explain DisparitiesBased on Credit Risk or Cost

The Federal Reserve Board (FRB) staff tried to determine whether
legitimate, nonracial factors could account for the racial disparities in the
HMDA price data. 38 Unfortunately, HMDA reports do not include all relevant
creditworthiness information. 39 However, the FRB staff were able to control for
income, assets, and a credit score proxy and found
that other variables could
40
disparities.
racial
the
of
all,
not
but
some,
explain
In particular, the FRB staff found that controlling for income, loan size, and
other borrower-related factors accounted for about 25% of the disparities, and
that controlling for lender identity accounted for another 45%, leaving the
remaining 30% of the disparity unexplained by available variables. 4 1 It is
important to note that the FRB staff could control for neither credit scores or
credit histories nor for whether the interest rate was fixed or adjustable, two
factors that are likely to explain some of the disparities. 42 This pattern-large
pricing disparities that are only slightly reduced by accounting for borrower
characteristics, but significantly reduced by considering which lenders
borrowers use-is consistent in the four years of data currently available (20042007). 43 Even after controlling for both borrower factors and the concentration
of minorities in the portfolios of high cost lenders, the FRB staff s 44analysis still
showed blacks twice as likely as whites to get subprime mortgages.
The story that emerges from the FRB staff s analysis is that minorities pay
higher interest rates for mortgages partly because some lenders charge higher
interest rates than others, and minority borrowers disproportionately end up

35. 2004 HMDA Data, supranote 25, at 377 tbl.10.
36. See 2007 HMDA Data, supra note 34, at A139.
37. Id. atA 40tbl.18.
38. See 2004 HMDA Data, supra note 25, at 376-80.
39. Seeid. at379-81.
40. Id.at 379-80.
41. 2005 HMDA Data, supranote 27, at Al 59.
42. Id.atA]41.
43. See 2004 HMDA Data, supra note 25, at 376; 2005 HMDA Data, supra note 27, at
A159; 2007 HMDA Data, supra note 34, at A139.
44. 2007 HMDA Data, supranote 34, at A139.
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with loans from those lenders. 45 The racial segregation among lenders, however,
could not fully explain the price disparities.
The FRB staff studies did not include robust controls for borrower credit
qualifications apart from income and loan size. 4 6 Other researchers have tried to
fill that gap. Bocian, Ernst, and Lee supplemented HMDA data for 2004 with
credit scores and other relevant underwriting variables from a proprietary
47
database to see how much of the racial price disparities could be explained.
This study did not control for lender identity and used a sample of mortgages
made by subprime lenders only. 48 Bocian, Ernst, and Lee found that after
controlling for mortgage product type, credit score, loan-to-value, and other
variables, blacks were 6.1% to 34.3% more likely than whites to receive a
higher rate subprime mortgage, and
Latinos were 28.6% to 44.6% more likely
49
to receive a higher rate mortgage.
Evidence that minorities are steered toward subprime lenders emerges, for
example, when looking at borrowers with high credit scores and marginal loanto-value ratios. These are borrowers who typically would have qualified in 2004
for either a prime or subprime higher cost mortgage. In that category, 21.3% of
blacks received higher cost loans, compared with 14.5% of Hispanics and 7.5%
of whites.5 °
The FRB staff analysis and the Bocian, Ernst, and Lee study measured
discrimination in pricing as a binary variable-whether a lender placed a
borrower in a higher cost (i.e., subprime) mortgage or not. The fact that lenders
do not report APRs for mortgages below the high cost threshold 51 seriously
limits the HMDA data on APRs. Thus, studies based on HMDA data cannot
evaluate possible discrimination along the entire mortgage price spectrum.
Dr. Marsha Courchane assembled a proprietary database from a large group
of lenders that included APRs for all mortgages, prime and subprime, as well as
a full range of explanatory variables that could contribute to the racial price
differences in the mortgage market.52 This permitted her to treat the APR price
outcome as a continuous variable; she could measure the effect of race on price
directly, rather than via the proxy of whether or not the mortgage is subprime.

45. Seeid. atA125.
46. See, e.g., 2005 HMDA Data, supra note 27, at A] 41 (discussing controls used in
analysis).
47. DEBBIE GRUENSTEIN BOCIAN, KEITH S. ERNST & WEI LI, CENTER FOR RESPONSIBLE
LENDING, UNFAIR LENDING: THE EFFECT OF RACE AND ETHNICITY ON THE PRICE OF SUBPRIME

MORTGAGES 3 (2006), http://www.responsiblelending.org/pdfs/rrO

1-Unfair Lending-0506.pdf
48. See id.
49. Id. at 17-18 tbls.6 & 7.
50. Id. at II tbl.2.
51. See 12 C.F.R. § 203.4(a)(12) (2008).
52. Marsha J. Courchane, The Pricing of Home Mortgage Loans to Minority Borrowers:
How Much of the APR Differential Can We Explain?, 29 J. REAL EST. RES. 399, 400 (2007).
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Using 2004 and 2005 loan data, she found that blacks paid APRs that were
roughly 1.2% higher than those paid by non-Hispanic
whites, and Hispanic
53
borrowers paid 0.56% to 0.74% higher APRs. However, she also found that a
comprehensive set of variables could explain most of the difference; these
variables determine (a) whether a borrower gets aprime or subprime mortgage
and (b) what interest rate the borrower pays. 5Thus, the observed price
differences have much to do with the fact that minorities are far more likely to
deal with subprime lenders than prime lenders and credit, loan, and
neighborhood characteristics. However, there were still statistically significant
differences between APRs paid by blacks, Hispanics, and non-Hispanic whites,
even after accounting for the full set of explanatory variables.55
The variables Dr. Courchane used included not only Fair Isaac Corp.
(FICO) credit scores, loan-to-value ratios, and debt-to-income ratios but also a
variety of loan features-the presence of a prepayment penalty or variable rate,
neighborhood characteristics such as loan amount, degree of competition among
lenders and average homeowner education level. 56 There was also a positive
correlation between higher APRs and getting a loan through a broker-a
wholesale channel-rather than a retail lender.57
There are two troubling aspects to Dr. Courchane's findings. First, a
number of the explanatory variables are not obviously related to justifiable
lender costs. For example, the presence of a prepayment penalty seems to
explain why more minority borrowers end up in the subprime market and thus
58
pay higher rates. Dr. Courchane did not find the penalties to correlate with a
significant reduction in the APR, as prepayment penalties should have. 9
Prepayment penalties should lower the lender's cost, not increase them. In the
case of the wholesale versus retail variable, using a broker contributed
independently to higher APRs. 6 1 Minority borrowers are more likely to use the

53. Id. at 405 exhibit 2.
54. Id.at431.
55. Id.at 429.
56. Id.at412-13.
57. See id. at 430.
58. Id.at 427 exhibit 10. Dr. Courchane treats the presence of a prepayment penalty as an
independent variable, and the prepayment penalty is a significant contributor to the borrower's
probability of getting a subprime loan, and hence a higher priced loan, credit qualifications being
held equal. See id. at 414, 416 exhibit 3. This could mean that borrowers who "choose" loans with
prepayment penalties are thereby forced to shop in the higher priced part ofthe mortgage market,
or it could, as Dr. Courchane points out, mean that it is the borrower's assignment to the subprime
market that produces the prepayment penalty, and not vice versa. See id. at 437 n.37.
59. Id.at 414, 424 exhibit 9, 427 exhibit 10.
60. John Farris & Christopher A. Richardson, The Geography of Subprime Mortgage
Prepayment Penalty Patterns, 15 HOUSING POL'Y DEBATE 687, 692-93 (2004).
61. Courchane, supranote 52, at 430.
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wholesale channel, 62 another explanation that is problematic from a policy
standpoint.
Second, the fact that we can explain the predominance of minorities using
subprime lenders and in higher priced loan divisions because of lower
educational attainment and reduced competition in their census tract is hardly a
neutral justification for the resulting higher APRs. If a single lender were to
explicitly assign less educated borrowers to its higher priced division, credit
scores and other factors being equal, that would surely not be regarded as a
neutral, nondiscriminatory practice. The evidence that minority borrowers are
more likely to have subprime mortgages because they are less educated, live in
areas with fewer competing lenders, and are more likely to use a broker is
consistent with the steering hypothesis: that minorities are steered to more
expensive lenders and channels. To look at it another way, there are lenders
who specialize in• charging
higher prices
•
•64 to mortgage borrowers with lower
education 65levels and in less served neighborhoods. This, of course, is reverse
redlining.
To summarize, different studies reach different conclusions about how
much of the racial price disparities can be explained. This is mostly because the
different study authors considered different sets of possible explanations. Taken
together, the studies actually paint a fairly consistent picture. Factors relating to
the homeowner's credit, income, and property value alone cannot fully explain
price disparities. On the other hand, the identity of the lender, the channel used
(prime versus subprime, broker versus retail), and the local market
characteristics (i.e., neighborhoods with few competing lenders) help complete
the picture of how racial disparities come about. Nevertheless, even the most
complete set of variables does not fully explain the race disparities. To better
understand how price discrimination and steering occurs, we now turn to a
description of how pricing works in the various segments of today's residential
mortgage market.

62. Kellie K. Kim-Sung & Sharon Hermanson, Experiences of Older Refinance Mortgage
Loan Borrowers: Broker- and Lender-Originated Loans, AARP PPI DATA DIGEST (AARP,
Washington, D.C.), Jan. 2003, at 1, 2, available at http://assets.aarp.org/rgcenter/post-import/
dd83_loans.pdf
63. Apgar & Calder, supra note 2, at 111-15.
64. See CAL. REINVESTMENT COAL. ET AL., PAYING MORE FOR THE AMERICAN DREAM:
THE SUBPRIME SHAKEOUT AND ITS IMPACT ON LOWER-INCOME AND MINORITY COMMUNITIES iii (2008), http://www.calreinvestorg/system/assets/125.pdf

65. See Raymond H. Brescia, Subprime Communities: Reverse Redlining, the Fair Housing
Act and Emerging Issues in Litigation Regarding the Subprime Mortgage Crisis, 2 ALB. GOV'T L.
REV. 164, 167 (2009).

https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol60/iss3/5

10

White: Borrowing While Black: Applying Fair Lending Laws to Risk-Based M

2009]

FAIR LENDING LAWS

111. WHY Do BLACKS AND HISPANICS PAY MORE? How MORTGAGE PRICES
ARE SET

A. Assignment ofHomeowners to Channels, Lenders, and Products
There are many different ways for a consumer to apply for a mortgage. The
mortgage market in the 2000s is segmented into various channels by which
money from investors and depositors turns into loans for homeowners. These
range from traditional banks which intermediate their own customers' deposits
and other customers' mortgage loans to specialized mortgage brokers and
lenders who originate mortgages solely in order to sell them on the secondary
market. 67 The secondary market in turn packages mortgages for distribution by
investment banks, who convert them into securities that are sold to individual
and institutional investors. 68 Banks are highly regulated and supervised by
Federal banking agencies, while mortgage brokers and investment
banks
69
making mortgages using the originate-to-distribute model are not.
Minority borrowers are far more likely to receive loans through less
regulated and higher priced channels than white borrowers.70 Dr. Courchane's
pricing study reveals that a significant factor causing minorities to pay higher
mortgage rates is their greater likelihood of getting a mortgage through a broker
rather than by dealing directly with lenders. She also concluded that one-half
to two-thirds of the pricing disparity between whites and minority borrowers
results from the greater likelihood that minority borrowers end up getting
mortgages from subprime lenders.72 This may be a result of minorities'
historical distrust of banks, their willingness to trust mortgage brokers active in
local communities, or a variety of other factors. Whatever the cause, the result is
that minority borrowers are not randomly distributed among lenders or
channels. 73 They are more likely to borrow from lenders that specialize in

66. WILLIAM APGAR, AMAL BENDIMERAD & REN S. ESSENE, JOINT CTR. FOR HOUS.
STUDIES OF HARVARD UNIVERSITY, MORTGAGE MARKET CHANNELS AND FAIR LENDING: AN
ANALYSIS OF HMDA DATA, 5 (2007), http://www.jchs.harvard.edu/publications/finance/mm072_mortgage market channels.pdf
67. See id. at 5, 7.
68. See id. at 6.
69. See Kathleen C. Engel & Patricia A. McCoy, Predatory Lending: What Does Wall
Street Have to Do with It?, 15 HOUSING POL'Y DEBATE 715, 715-16 (2004); Christopher L.
Peterson, Predatory Structured Finance, 28 CARDOzO L. REV. 2185, 2255-63 (2007); APGAR,
BENDIMERAD & ESSENE, supra note 66, at 16.
70. See Apgar & Calder, supra note 2, at 102; Vikas Bajaj & Ford Fessenden, What's
Behind the Race Gap?, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 4, 2007, at 16.
71. See Courchane, supranote 52, at 430.
72. Id. at 406.
73. See id.

Published by Scholar Commons, 2020

11

South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 60, Iss. 3 [2020], Art. 5
SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 60: 677

subprime mortgages, regardless of their credit, and more likely to borrow
through brokers interacting with wholesale lenders.74
Mortgage brokers have considerably more price discretion than loan
officers working for banks and retail lenders. They can choose products and
pricing from a variety of different wholesale lenders in a market that is not
transparent to consumers.7 5 Perhaps not surprisingly, researchers have found
that mortgages originated through brokers have higher rates and fees than loans
originated through other channels, controlling for borrower credit, property
value, and loan terms.76
Even once a broker or borrower has selected a particular lender who will
receive the application, discrimination in the preapplication and application
stages can result in minority borrowers with equal credit quality receiving
inferior (i.e., higher priced) products in several ways. First, marginal borrowers
who are white are likely to receive assistance in improving their application and
information about a number of different loan products, while marginal black
borrowers may be discouraged from applying at all, or at least will be given less
information than their white counterparts. 7 Thus, the odds of a particular black
mortgage seeker finding the most competitively priced and suitable loan are
reduced because blacks essentially face higher search costs than whites.
Second, mortgage lenders and brokers may perceive blacks as less price
sensitive, perhaps due to the belief that discrimination by other market
participants limits their shopping options, or perhaps due to other implicit
biases. Consequently, lenders and brokers tend to quote higher estimated
interest rates, fees, and closing costs to blacks than to comparable whites.78
Moreover, the broker or loan officer may assume that a black or other minority
borrower has weak credit and assign the borrower to a costlier but less stringent
lender based on that unverified assumption. Stereotypes about credit history and

See APGAR, BENDIMERAD & ESSENE, supranote 66, at 43.
Apgar & Calder, supra note 2, at 105-06.
KEITH ERNST, DEBBIE BOCIAN & WEI LI, CTR. FOR RESPONSIBLE LENDING, STEERED
WRONG:
BROKERS,
BORROWERS,
AND
SUBPRIME
LOANS
3-4
(2008),
http://www.responsiblelending.org/pdfs/steered-wrong-brokers-borrowers-and-subprime-loans.pdf.
77. See Rooting Out Discriminationin Mortgage Lending: Using HMDA as a Toolfor Fair
Lending Enforcement: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Oversight and Investigations of the H.
Comm. on Financial Services, I I0th Cong. 10-12 (2007) [hereinafter Hearing] (statement of
Ginny Hamilton, Executive Director, Fair Housing Center of Greater Boston) (citing research
involving matched pairs of testers applying for mortgages in Boston area).
78. See id. at 7-10 (testimony of John Taylor, President and CEO, National Community
Reinvestment Coalition (NCRC)) (citing matched pair test shopping by NCRC in seven different
metropolitan areas and finding that minority shoppers were quoted fewer different rates, were less
likely to receive closing cost information, were more likely to be offered a variable rather than a
fixed rate, and were more likely to be questioned about their credit and discouraged from
applying).
74.
75.
76.
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price sensitivity probably act in combination with incentive payments to
produce the observed steering effect.
It is important to emphasize that all these steering and pre-application
practices (a) contribute to disparate pricing in a seemingly neutral pricing
system and (b) result from lender policies and practices that can be the subject
of legal remedies.
B. Description ofSubprime PriceMatrices
Interest rates for subprime
mortgages
are •generally
determined by a set of
•
•
79
rules and adjustments spelled out in rate matrices. The typical subprime rate
matrix used between 1995 and 2007 allows a broker or loan officer to look up a
rate based on the borrower's credit score (often the FICO score, but sometimes
a score based on the lender's own credit model), the borrower's loan-to-value
ratio, and the basic mortgage product (fixed versus adjustable rate, often with
separate matrices for "no-doc" loans or other special cases). 8 0 The matrix then
typically requires additional adjustments to the base rate, such as adding 0.5%
for small loans or a loan without the standard prepayment penalty. 8 Some
adjustment factors reflect borrower characteristics, such as whether the home is
owner occupied, and others reflect loan product choice, such as paying a higher
rate for a no-doc loan or a fixed rate loan. Ordinarily, given the answers to six
or seven seemingly objective questions about the borrower and the desired 8 loan,
2
a loan officer or broker can determine the interest rate from the rate matrix.
Only a relatively small number of variables that are actually used to set
mortgage prices reflect borrower characteristics. The FICO score, along with
the number of late mortgage payments and bankruptcy history, are usually the
only credit quality variables. Other borrower-related variables include the loan
amount and loan-to-value ratio, whether the property is owner-occupied, and
whether the loan purpose is purchase or refinance. On the other hand, any given
borrower has a dizzying array of product choices, depending on whether the
borrower provides full income documentation, prefers an adjustable or a fixed
rate, pays a broker premium, and so forth.8 3 The complexity of the matrices and
the resulting variation in prices is as much a function of product proliferation as
it is of differences among borrowers.

79. See Alan M. White, Risk-Based Mortgage Pricing: Present and Future Research, 15
HOUSING POL'Y DEBATE 503, 509-12 & tbls.1 & 2 (2004) for a general discussion of subprime
lenders' rate matrices.
80. See id.at509.
81. See id.at514.
82. See id.at512.
83. Seeid.at515.
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In addition to the wide variety of price and product choices in a single
matrix, borrowers (or brokers) also face a wide variety of separate matrices to
choose from. Some lenders offer multiple matrices to brokers and also use
separate matrices or computerized pricing schemes for their retail and other
divisions. Price discrimination is thus a consequence of the borrower's (or
broker's) choice of market channel, lender, and product as well as the pricing
model and its application.
C. Subjective Pricingin the Subprime Market
There are several ways that pricing discretion could still make its way into
setting a subprime mortgage interest rate notwithstanding a lender's matrix.
First, some lenders allow their loan officers or brokers to use the matrix rate as a
minimum but also allow them discretion to charge (and indeed reward them for
charging) higher rates at the officer or broker's discretion.84 Other lenders allow
"exceptions" from the pricing matrix by retail loan officers.8 5 Regulators
singled out these discretionary pricing regimes as highly susceptible to racially
disparate outcomes and, hence, to fair lending violations.
Wholesale subprime lenders almost invariably gave brokers they dealt with
the discretion to increase the base interest rate. Indeed, the yield spread
premium (YSP) system encouraged brokers to do so.8 7 YSPs are payments
lenders make to brokers computed on the basis of the interest markup that the
broker persuades the borrower to accept.88 For example, wholesale mortgage
lenders typically will offer brokers a payment of 1% of the loan amount if the
consumer's interest rate is set in given increments above the "par" rate.8 9 If the
consumer knew about this, the consumer could agree to a higher interest rate in
return for not paying the broker a fee in cash or out of the loan principal. On the
other hand, two studies of YSPs have shown that consumers do not understand

84. See Hearing, supra note 77, at 36-37 (testimony of Sandra F. Braunstein Director,
Division of Consumer and Community Affairs, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Res. Sys.) (noting
that the Federal Reserve referred two lenders for fair lending enforcement action in part due to
discretionary pricing systems); FED. FIN. INSTS. EXAMINATION COUNCIL, INTERAGENCY FAIR
LENDING EXAMINATION PROCEDURES 8 (2007), http://www.ffiec.gov/pdf/fairlend.pdf

85.
(May 11,
Freedom
86.
87.

See Findings of Inquiry into Loan Pricing at Countrywide, OFF. N.Y. ST. ATT'Y GEN.
2006) (on file with author). Note that this source was obtained by the author through a
of Information Act (FOIA) request.
See sources cited supranote 84.
ERNST, BOCIAN & LEE, supra note 76, at 4-5.

88. Howell E. Jackson & Laurie Burlingame, Kickbacks or Compensation: The Case of
Yield Spread Premiums, 12 STAN. J.L. BUS. & FIN. 289, 291 (2007).
89. Id.
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how they function and that the use of YSPs in combination
with upfront fees
90
usually increases the total amount received by brokers.
In addition to raising the base interest rate, a broker has wide discretion in
91
charging the borrower a broker fee, or "points," as a percentage of the loan.
Not surprisingly, the subjective and discretionary setting of points and YSPs in
subprime mortgage loans has led to race and sex discrimination in pricing. One
such case was the subject of a complaint filed by the U.S. Justice Department
against subprime mortgage lender Delta Funding.92 The government alleged
that:
[a] comparison of Delta's broker fees paid by 1,328 African American
females and 262 white males in Kings and Queens Counties during the
1996-1998 period show that the mean broker fee for African American
females was 6.24% of the loan amount, whereas the broker fee for
similarly situated white males was 4.64% of the loan amount. This
means, for example, that for a loan in the $100,000 to $125,000 range,
African American females paid over $1,500 more in broker fees than
did white males. There is virtually no possibility that this difference in
the group means could have occurred by chance. In statistical terms,
when controlling for loan size, the probability that the difference
occurred by chance is less than .0001. The difference in price between
the African American female borrowers was unrelated
to the
93
qualifications of the borrowers or the risk to the lender.
Similarly, the New York Attorney General found that Countrywide's mortgage
portfolio revealed significantly higher broker compensation for black and
Hispanic customers than for white customers after controlling for relevant credit
94
factors.
D. Objective Criteriathat DisadvantageMinorities
A number of pricing variables are likely to disadvantage blacks and
Hispanics. The most obvious are the variables tied to property value. Homes

90. See id. at 291-92; SUSAN E. WOODWARD, U.S. DEP'T OF HOUS. & URBAN DEv., A
STUDY OF CLOSING COSTS FOR FHA MORTGAGES
57-60 (2008), available at

http://www.huduser.org/Publications/pdf/FHAclosingcost.pdf
91. WOODWARD, supra note 90, at 60-63.
92. Complaint, United States v. Delta Funding Corp., No. CV-00-1872 (E.D.N.Y. 2000),
availableat http://www.ftc.gov/os/2000/3/deltacorp.htm.
93. Id.
94. N.Y. Att'y Gen., Presentation on Countrywide Investigation 39-44 [hereinafter
Countrywide Investigation] (unpublished presentation on file with the author).

Published by Scholar Commons, 2020

15

South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 60, Iss. 3 [2020], Art. 5
SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 60: 677

owned by blacks and Hispanics have significantly
lower market prices than
95
Subprime mortgage prices vary
homes owned by non-Hispanic whites.
considerably according to the loan-to-value ratio and the loan amount, both of
which are directly related to the property value. While it is true that the loan
amount is also a function of the amount of down payment or existing equity
provided by the borrower, there again minorities are disadvantaged. Because of
their much lower available cash and liquid assets,
minority mortgage
applicants are likely to borrow at higher loan-to-value ratios.
Minority borrowers are also likely to borrow smaller loan amounts, given
the lower average value of their homes. Many subprime rate matrices call for
adding 0.5% or more to the interest rate for loans below a certain amount, often
$50,000 or $75,000. Other lenders simply refuse to make loans at all below a
certain amount so there are fewer competitors and less price competition for the
small loan segment. It is also the case that blacks and Hispanics have lower
credit scores than whites, on average. 97 Pricing based on credit scores will
necessarily produce higher prices for minority applicants.
While each of these variables bears an intuitive relationship to potential
defaults or lender losses, each will also result in price discrimination. Taken
together, the various objective and subjective pricing practices as well as
steering of customers among lenders and products all contribute to minorities
paying more for mortgage credit. Whether the resulting price discrimination is
or should be permitted is the topic of Part IV.
IV.

APPLYING FAIR LENDING LAWS TO SUBPRIME MORTGAGE PRICING

A.

Legal Tests for DisparateTreatment and DisparateImpact

Racial discrimination in mortgage terms, including prices, is illegal under
99
98
both the Fair Housing Act (FaHA) and the Equal Credit Opportunity Act
(ECOA).

95. Bucks, Kennickell & Moore, supra note 10, at A21 tbl.8 (noting that the median home
value for non-whites and Hispanics in 2004 was $99,100 but was $138,500 for non-Hispanic
whites).
96. Id. at A12 tbl.5. Non-white or Hispanic families had median financial assets of $7,600 in
2004 while non-Hispanic whites had $41,300. Id.
THE

97. BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE SYS., CREDIT SCORING AND ITS EFFECTS ON
AVAILABILITY
AND
AFFORDABILITY
OF
CREDIT
(2007),
available at

http://www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/rptcongress/creditscore/overview.htm;
New Help for 'Subprime 'Borrowers, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 25, 2007, at 12.
98. 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-3619 (2000).
99. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1691-1691f(2006).
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Direct proof that a lender denied loans or set terms because of an
applicant's race is rarely available. 100 Enforcement agencies and victims of
discrimination typically use two inference-based theories to prove
discrimination in employment, housing, and credit: disparate treatment and
disparate impact. 101
A plaintiff may show a prima facie case of disparate treatment by
circumstantial evidence if (1) the plaintiff is a member of a protected class; (2)
the plaintiff applied for and was qualified for credit; (3) the plaintiff was denied
credit or given terms less favorable than comparable applicants; and (4) the
defendant continued granting credit, or granted it on more favorable terms, to
similarly qualified applicants. 02 The lender is then entitled to prove that there
was a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for the adverse credit decision. 0 3 In
the context of credit pricing, a plaintiff could prove a disparate treatment claim
by matched pair analysis, 0 where it can show a minority borrower or group of
borrowers paid a higher price than nonminority borrowers with matched credit
qualifications and similar loan products. 105
Mortgage pricing may also be challenged based on disparate impact
analysis under either FaHA 10 6 or ECOA.1 7 A court may find illegal
discrimination when a seemingly neutral policy or practice, for example, a price

100. But see Hargraves v. Capital City Mortgage Corp., 140 F. Supp. 2d 7, 18 (D.D.C.
2000) (finding evidence that lender deliberately targeted black borrowers); McGlawn v. Pa.
Human Relations Comm'n, 891 A.2d 757, 764 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2006) (finding the same result).
101. For a more extensive discussion of disparate treatment and disparate impact analysis in
the context of mortgage lending, see Brescia, supra note 65.
102. See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973) (establishing the
test for disparate treatment in the context of employment discrimination); Hood v. Midwest Sav.
Bank, 95 F. App'x 768, 778 (6th Cir. 2004) (establishing the test for discrimination under FaHA
and ECOA); Ring v. First Interstate Mortgage, Inc., 984 F.2d 924, 926 (8th Cir. 1993) (extending
the Court's approach in McDonnell Douglas Corp. to FaHA).
103. Hood, 95 F. App'x at 778.
104. See, e.g., EEOC v. IBM, 583 F. Supp. 875, 900-01 (D. Md. 1984) (using matched pair
analysis to test employment discrimination claims).
105. See Statement of Charges and Notice of Intention to Enter an Order to Revoke License,
Impose Fine, Order Restitution, Prohibit from Industry, and Collect Annual Assessments,
Examination Fees, and Investigation Fees at 2-5, In re Countrywide Home Loans Inc., No. C-08030-08-SCOI (Wash. Dep't of Fin. Inst. Jun. 23, 2008) [hereinafter Statement of Charges],
availableat http://www.dfi.wa.gov/CS Orders/C-08-030-08-SC01 .pdf
106. See Keith v. Volpe, 858 F.2d 467, 484 (9th Cir. 1988).
107. 12 C.F.R. pt. 202, supp. I, § 202.6 cmt. 2 (2008); Powell v. Am. Gen. Fin., Inc., 310 F.
Supp. 2d 481, 487 (N.D.N.Y. 2004). Some have argued that courts and agencies should not use
disparate impact analysis for evaluating discrimination claims under ECOA. Peter N. Cubita &
Michelle Hartmann, The ECOA Discrimination Proscriptionand Disparate Impact Interpreting
the Meaning of the Words that Actually Are There, 61 BuS. LAW. 829, 842 (2006). That position
has gained little or no traction in the courts or among regulatory agencies, and the issue is beyond
the scope of this Article.
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increment for small loans, has a disparate impact on minority groups and
business necessity does not justify the policy or practice. 108 The application of
disparate impact analysis to pricing disparities in the mortgage market is clear.
If identifiable pricing policies or practices such as dividing applicants into
different product categories or granting pricing discretion to mortgage brokers
result in minority borrowers paying higher interest rates, lenders must
demonstrate that business necessity justifies the pricing policies or practices.
The following examples illustrate the application of disparate impact analysis to
mortgage pricing.
B. Expert Evidence on Pricing Disparities in the Wells Fargo Fair
Lending Litigation
Recently, plaintiffs have filed a number of fair lending lawsuits challenging
racial disparities in mortgage prices. 109 These cases have focused primarily on
the practice of paying brokers YSPs and the allegation that the lender policy of
paying such premiums has a disparate impact on minority borrowers. 110 The
claim has been that brokers choose to increase interest rates above the lowest
rate for which the borrower qualifies more frequently and to a greater extent for
minorities than white borrowers.I' Hence, the availability of YSPs is a practice
having a disparate impact on minorities." 2 However, most of these cases have
not progressed beyond the motion to dismiss stage. Thus, courts have had little
opportunity to consider how to evaluate price discrimination claims on the basis
of an evidentiary record rather than bare allegations in pleadings.

108. See Zamudio v. HSBC N. Am. Holdings Inc., 2008 WL 517138, at*2 (N.D. Ill.
Feb.
20, 2008).
109. See Ware v. Indymac Bank, FSB, 534 F. Supp. 2d 835, 840 (N.D. Ill. 2008) (denying
motion to dismiss claims that payment of YSPs to mortgage brokers had disparate impact on
minority borrowers); Newman v. Apex Fin. Group, Inc., No. 1:07-CV-04475, 2008 WL 130924, at
*1 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 11, 2008) (denying motion to dismiss because the plaintiff provided sufficient
facts suggesting the possibility that minority discrimination occurred); Jackson v. Novastar
Mortgage, Inc., No. 2:06-CV-02249, 2007 WL 4568976, at *9 (W.D. Tenn. Dec. 20, 2007)
(declining to dismiss claim of discrimination because the plaintiff adequately pleaded facts that the
defendant used "yield-spread premium incentives in an attempt to take advantage" of minority
borrowers); Martinez v. Freedom Mortgage Team, Inc., 527 F. Supp. 2d 827, 835 (N.D. Ill. 2007)
(denying motion to dismiss because "targeting racial minorities for higher cost loans sets out a
discrimination-based theory of recovery").
110. See, e.g.,
Martine:, 527 F. Supp. 2d at 834-35 (holding that discriminatory effect is
sufficient to survive a motion to dismiss).
111.See id.
112. Seeid.
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In Walker v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 113 opposing expert reports from
115
114
and Marsha Courchane
respected mortgage scholars Ira Goldstein
highlighted several of the factors leading to race-based price disparities and
addressed both potential disparate treatment and disparate impact. 116
Unfortunately, the court did not resolve the legal issues because the parties
settled the case. Nevertheless, the expert reports offer a useful source of detailed
information.
Dr. Goldstein's report considered both disparate treatment and disparate
impact analysis." 7 Using matched-pair analysis, he found that the plaintiff, Ms.
Walker, paid a higher interest rate than fourteen white borrowers with
essentially the same credit score, loan-to-value ratio, and debt-to-income
ratio. 11 He also pointed out that although Wells Fargo's price matrix imposes a
0.5% interest rate increment for loans under $75,000, a category into which Ms.
Walker fell, her rate exceeded that of comparable borrowers by 2%-5%; thus
the loan size pricing could not fully account for the disparity. 119
To consider their potential disparate impact, Dr. Goldstein also examined
the pricing rules that led to Ms. Walker's APR of 11.11%. He found that the
policy of adding 0.5% to the rate for loans less than $75,000 had a significant
disparate impact on blacks and persons living in predominantly black census

113. No. 05-cv-6666 (E.D. Pa. dismissed Feb. 29, 2008). The author represented the
plaintiff in the litigation.
114. See, e.g., Ira J. Goldstein, Mlethodsfor Identifying Lendersfor Investigation Under the
Fair Housing Act, in MORTGAGE LENDING, RACIAL DISCRIMINATION, AND FEDERAL POLICY 505
(John Goering & Ron Wienk eds., 1996) (presenting techniques for identifying institutions
engaged in the practice of lending discrimination by analyzing HMDA data); Ira J. Goldstein &
Gregory D. Squires, Obfuscating the Reality of Lending Discrimination Through Deceptively
Rigorous Statistical Analysis: Comment on Leven and Sykuta, 30 URB. AFF. REV. 580 (1995)
(providing a stringent critique of a paper that minimized discrimination in mortgage lending and
highlighting the authors' inappropriate selection of controls and errors in statistical techniques).
115. See, e.g., Judith A. Clarke, Nilanjana Roy & Marsha J. Courchane, On the Robustness
of Racial Discrimination Findings in Mortgage Lending Studies, 39 APPLIED ECON. 1 (2008)
(exploring the sensitivity of disparate treatment findings from statistical models of mortgage
lenders' underwriting standards); Marsha J. Courchane, Brian J. Surette & Peter M. Zorn,
Subprime Borrowers: Mortgage Transitions and Outcomes, 29 J. REAL EST. FIN. & ECON. 365
(2004) (addressing the questions of whether lenders inappropriately channel borrowers into the
subprime market, whether subprime mortgage borrowers are stuck in this market, and whether
borrowers who take out subprime mortgages face higher costs).
116. See Report of Ira J. Goldstein, Ph.D. at 1 30-31, Walker v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A.,
No. 05-cv-6666 (E.D. Pa. July 2, 2007); Supplemental Rebuttal Report of Marsha J. Courchane,
Ph.D. at 11 2-3, Walker v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., No. 05-cv-6666 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 7, 2007).
117. See Report of Ira J. Goldstein, Ph.D., supranote 116.
118. Affidavit of Ira J. Goldstein at 11 8-10, Walker v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., No. 05-cv6666 (E.D. Pa. July 20, 2007).
119. Id. at 111.
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tracts. 120 Moreover, he found that Wells Fargo's mortgage prices for all
mortgages less than $75,000 were much higher in predominantly black areas
(70.5% of loans in these areas had at least a 3 point rate spread) than in white
neighborhoods (only 14.2% had at least a 3 point rate spread) and therefore the
small loan adjustment only partly explained the racial disparities. 121
In his report, Dr. Goldstein alluded to two other pricing practices as
potential sources of racial disparities. First, Wells Fargo penalized Ms. Walker
for having a credit score from only one of the three major credit bureaus,
essentially discounting the single credit score she had. 122 Second, Wells Fargo
permitted
Ms. Walker's broker to increase her interest rate in order to generate a
123
YSP. Dr. Goldstein offered no conclusions regarding either the impact of
these policies
24 or their possible business necessity, citing the need for more
lender data. 1
Dr. Courchane's reports evaluated not so much whether Wells Fargo had
priced Ms. Walker differently due to race, but whether legitimate business
factors could adequately
explain the, disparities
in pricing between all black and
•
•
• 125
all white borrowers in Wells Fargo's portfolio. First, she asserted that Wells
Fargo did not control the fees the broker charged and, therefore, could not be
responsible for that part of the final APR that was a product of broker fees.126
Second, she pointed out that Ms. Walker's credit score was quite low, and thus
the high rate she paid should not be surprising. 127 Third, she constructed a
regression model using data from a sample of Wells Fargo loans to measure the
contribution of race vis-A-vis other factors in determining the borrower's
APR. 128 She found that credit scores and debt-to-income ratios were the major
drivers of interest rates, and race was not a statistically significant factor.129
The rub, however, was that Dr. Courchane selected 185 loans from a
population of more than 17,700 mortgage loans originated by Wells Fargo
affiliates in the Philadelphia metropolitan area in 2005 and 2006. The reason
she chose this subset of loans was that Wells Fargo had identified these loans as
belonging to a channel, i.e., its wholesale lending division, and within that

120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.

See Report of Ira J. Goldstein, Ph.D., supranote 116, at4 20, 23, 25.
Id.
Id. at 11 26-27.
Id. at131.
See id.
See Supplemental Rebuttal Report of Marsha J. Courchane, Ph.D., supra note 116, at

126.
127.
128.
129.
130.

Id. at116-7.
Id. at 7.
Id. at126, 65 app.4 chart 9.
Seeid. at126.
Seeid. at126n.18, app.4tbl.17.

25.
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division, to a product category known as Home Credit Solutions. 131 As Dr.
Goldstein pointed out in his rebuttal, minority mortgage borrowers dominated
this product category, which also featured some of the highest prices among all
mortgages made by Wells Fargo. 132 Wells Fargo gave borrowers with credit
scores as low as Ms. Walker's (and lower) loans from other channels and
product categories. 33 Therefore, the product classifications were not
independently based on credit qualifications, but on internal marketing
decisions.
In her second rebuttal report, Dr. Courchane responded by constructing
several different pricing regression models using all 17,764 approved loans.
The most complete model controlled for loan amount, lien status, owner
occupancy status, loan purpose, fixed or adjustable rate, FICO score, debt-toincome ratio, loan-to-value ratio, property location (county among the five
counties in the Philadelphia metropolitan statistical area), channel, and
subchannel. 135 A borrower's FICO score was the leading credit-related price
determinant, adding as much as 2.27% to the rate for FICO scores under 520.136
With this model, Dr. Courchane was able to reduce race-based price disparities
to about 31 basis points (0.31%)-explaining most of the remaining price
differences based on all the other variables.
An alternative model looking
only at the loans in the Home Credit Solutions subchannel (1,624 loans)
reduced the difference to 14 basis points (0.14%).138
The channel and subchannel variables represented different divisions or
mortgage categories within Wells Fargo. Assignment to the Home Credit
Solutions subchannel, independent of credit score and the other variables,
increased the APR by 1.69% for wholesale and 1.84% for retail. 139 Further,
independent of all these variables, including channel and subchannel, being
black increased Wells Fargo mortgage borrower's rates by 0.31%. 140 Equally
interesting was that being in Philadelphia rather than one of the suburban
counties had a small (0.06%-0.07%) but statistically significant effect on
mortgage rates.' 4'

131.
132.
6666 (E.D.
133.
134.
11 26 n. 18,
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.
141.

Id. at 11.
Affidavit of Ira J. Goldstein at 11 3-11, Walker v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., No. 05-cvPa. July 20, 2007).
Id.
See Supplemental Rebuttal Report of Marsha J. Courchane, Ph.D., supra note 116, at
app.4 tbl. 17.
Id. atapp.4tbl.17.
Id. at126, app.4tbl.17.
Id. at app.4, chart 9, tbl. 17.
Id.
Id. atapp.4tbl.17.
Id.
Id.
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Wells Fargo described its Home Credit Solutions subchannel as the
subprime product for borrowers who would have difficulty qualifying under
traditional criteria. 142 While borrowers with lower credit scores were clearly
concentrated in this subchannel, the segregation by credit score was not
exclusive. Some high score borrowers were in the Home Credit Solutions
subchannel, and43Dr. Courchane found borrowers with very low credit scores in
other channels. 1
The picture that emerges from these reports is an interesting one. It appears
that within a large financial institution such as Wells Fargo, mortgage prices for
borrowers with similar credit scores and qualifications vary widely according to
channels and products. It is as if a store charged higher prices for customers
coming in the east door than those coming in the west door, and somehow
directed most minority customers to the east door. While it is conceivable that a
lender like Wells Fargo could offer cost-driven business justifications for
charging different prices for loans made through different channels (e.g., broker
versus retail) it is hard to see how a lender could support selling the same
product-adjustable rate first lien subprime refinance mortgages-at different
prices using different names by business necessity.
Two concerns emerge from the reports in Walker. The first concern is the
unanswered questions about the impact of the broker fees, the small loan
adjustment policy, the thin credit file policy, and whether business necessity
provides a valid justification for these policies. Second is the question whether
business necessity can justify charging different interest rates according to
lender-defined channels and products that are racially segregated.
From the evidence developed so far, three distinct sets of practices emerge
as potential culprits in racial mortgage price disparities. First is the role of
mortgage brokers and the price discretion lenders delegate to them. Second is
the role of lender assignment of borrowers to different channels and products.
Third is the fundamental question of the validity of the risk-based pricing
models themselves.
C. Lender Responsibilityfor Broker Pricing: The RESPA Connection
Lenders making mortgages through a wholesale channel delegate much of
the loan origination process to brokers. 44 Brokers determine their own fees,
usually as a percentage of the loan amount.145 Broker fees affect the APR the
borrower pays in one of two ways. The broker may negotiate an interest rate

142.
143.
144.
145.

Id. at 11.
See id. at app.4 chart 1.
See ERNST, BOCIAN Li, supra note 76, at 6.
See id.
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above the borrower's qualifying minimum rate in order to receive a YSP from
the lender. 146 Brokers also collect upfront fees, or points, out of the loan amount
that count as prepaid finance charges; in other words, these fees reduce the net
amount financed and thereby increase the APR. 147
Lenders making wholesale loans through brokers thus extend pricing
discretion to brokers in two ways. Lenders who pay YSPs grant explicit price
discretion by allowing the broker to sell the borrower an interest rate above the
lender's par rate. 48 Even if the broker fee is charged up front, it is typically
financed by inclusion in the loan principal. 49 Prior to closing, the mortgage
lender will instruct its closing agent how to disburse the loan principal and will
authorize the payment of the broker's fee. 150 The lender has the ability to limit
broker fees or set guidelines for brokers it deals with. 151
Lender policies regarding broker compensation can have racially disparate
impacts under two related scenarios. First, there could simply be individual
brokers who make it their practice to charge higher fees to black borrowers; i.e.,
discrimination at the individual broker level. These brokers may perceive blacks
as less price sensitive or as having fewer competing offers from retail lenders
and other brokers. 152 Second, brokers charging systematically higher fees than
their competitors may concentrate their marketing in minority neighborhoods,
while more efficient, lower-cost brokers avoid those neighborhoods in both
cases because of their beliefs about the creditworthiness,
market competition,
153
and price sensitivity of those areas or those borrowers.
Wholesale mortgage lenders assert that they do not control the broker's
points and fees. However, the federal agencies involved in the Delta Funding
case took the position that because the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act
(RESPA) prohibits unearned fees and referral fees, 154 mortgage lenders have a
legal duty to insure that broker fees bear a reasonable relationship to the value
of services provided. 155 A wholesale mortgage lender's failure to have any
reasonable policies or guidelines for broker fees may be analogized to the car

146. See supra text accompanying notes 87-90.
147. See 12 C.F.R. § 226.4(a)(3) (2008); ELIZABETH RENUART ET AL., NAT'L CONSUMER
LAW CENTER, TRUTH IN LENDING 94-96, 213, 221 (6th ed. 2007).

148. See RENUART ET AL., supra note 147, at94.
149. Id.
150. See id.
151. See id.
152. See Hearing, supra note 77, at7-10 (testimony of John Taylor, President and CEO,
National Community Reinvestment Coalition (NCRC)).
153. Cf Apgar & Calder, supra note 2, at 103 ("[B]orrower race and neighborhood racial
composition still
appear to be significantly linked to access to prime loans.").
154. 12 U.S.C. § 2607(a) (2006).
155. Complaint, United States v. Delta Funding Corp., No. CV-00-1872 (E.D.N.Y. 2000),
availableat http://www. fic.gov/os/2000/3/deltacorp.htm.
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finance companies' practice of allowing dealer markups, 15 6 a practice
challenged as having a discriminatory
impact on minority consumers in
157
violation of fair lending laws.
Thus, a lender may be facilitating either overt discrimination or reverse
redlining 158 by brokers. In either case, the lender establishes the parameters for
broker compensation. The YSP implicates lenders most directly because the
lender imposes a higher interest rate on the borrower in order to fund a broker
payment. 59 But even in the case of upfront broker fees funded from loan
principal, the lender has the power to authorize, or limit, broker fees. 160 Even
apart from fair lending duties, lenders are responsible for the reasonableness of
broker fees under the RESPA,. which
bans payments of unearned fees or
161
kickbacks in mortgage transactions.
Like the automotive finance companies,
mortgage lenders will have to come to grips with the racial impact of delegating
pricing authority to broker-agents by establishing compensation policies
adequate to the task of ensuring that comparable borrowers pay comparable
broker fees.
D. Product and Channel: Are These Business Justificationsfor Disparate
Pricing?
From the standpoint of a lender's costs, some mortgages are different than
others. An adjustable-rate mortgage should ordinarily have a lower rate than a
fixed-rate mortgage, other things being equal, because the lender takes more
risk by committing
162 to a fixed rate over the life of a mortgage when market rates
may fluctuate.
Similarly, a 30-year mortgage is riskier than a 15-year
mortgage, other things being equal. Lenders consider mortgage loans to buy a

156. See Ian Ayres, Market Power and Inequality: A Competitive Conduct Standard for
Assessing When Disparate Impacts are Unjustified, 95 CAL. L. REV. 669, 700 (2007).
157. See Jones v. Ford Motor Credit Co., No. 1:00-CV-08330, 2005 WL 743213, at *2
(S.D.N.Y. Mar. 31, 2005); Cason v. Nissan Motor Acceptance Corp., 212 F.R.D. 518, 519 (M.D.
Tenn. 2002); Osborne v. Bank of Am., Nat'l Ass'n, 234 F. Supp. 2d 804, 807 (M.D. Tenn. 2002).
158. Reverse redlining refers to making loans on disadvantageous terms selectively in
disfavored minority communities. See Hargraves v. Capital City Mortgage Corp., 140 F. Supp. 2d
7, 20 (D.D.C. 2000) ("[Redlining is] the practice of denying the extension of credit to specific
geographic areas due to the income, race, or ethnicity of itsresidents." (quoting United Cos.
Lending Corp. v. Sargeant, 20 F. Supp. 2d 192, 203 n.5 (D. Mass. 1998))).
159. RENUART ET AL., supra note 147, at94.
160. See id.
161. See 12 U.S.C. § 2607(a) (2006); Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act Statement of
Policy 2001-1, 66 Fed. Reg. 53,052, 53,055 (Oct. 18, 2001) (codified at 24 C.F.R. pt. 3500)
(stating that lenders should "ensure that brokers are performing compensable services and
receiving only compensation that, in total,
is reasonable for those services provided").
162. See GRANT S. NELSON & DALE A. WHITMAN, REAL ESTATE FINANCE LAW 4 (4th ed.
2001).
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home-purchase loans-less risky than refinance loans, and loans made to
people who intend
.
,to. live
163in the home are less risky than mortgage loans to
investors and speculators.
On the other hand, the differences between and among these types of
mortgages, as they relate to risk, ought to be measurable in terms of costs to the
lender. Suppose that all of the lender's minority customers get adjustable-rate
mortgages and all of its white borrowers get fixed-rate mortgages. If, holding
credit qualifications constant, the lender charges a higher rate for adjustable-rate
loans or fails to pass on the lower cost of adjustable-rate loans fully to
customers of that product, that pricing practice will have a disparate impact and
business necessity cannot justify it. While genuinely different mortgage
products may have different costs, price differences should reflect the cost
difference, not the racial difference, in the customer pool for the product. Courts
and enforcement agencies should not simply treat different mortgage products
as wholly incommensurable. Instead, regulators should require lenders to
validate pricing differences based on measurable cost differences.
The case for price differentials is even weaker when the product or channel
classifications used by the lender describe the characteristics of borrowers rather
than those of loans. If borrowers with the same credit qualifications receive
different pricing for the same mortgage type (adjustable-rate refinance, for
example) by virtue of being assigned to a different lender-devised product or
channel, the product and channel categories are simply masks for borrower
segregation 164
and unjustified price discrimination.
In both Walker v. Wells Fargo
•165
Bank, N.A.
and In re Countrywide Home Loans, Inc.,
the boundaries
between products and channels were porous-not all borrowers with low credit
scores were in the subprime product, and some borrowers with high credit
scores were in the subprime.166
The New York Attorney General's investigation of Countrywide found that
the company separated borrowers into prime and subprime lending divisions,
but the boundaries between the prime and subprime divisions and products were
fluid.167 For example, FICO credit scores overlapped considerably, especially in
the midrange; here, borrowers with scores between 620 and 700 FICO were
present in large numbers in prime and subprime products alike. 168 The

163.
164.
165.
166.
app.4 chart
167.
168.

See id. at 1-2.
No. 05-cv-6666 (E.D. Pa. dismissed Feb. 29, 2008).
Statement of Charges, supra note 105.
See Supplemental Rebuttal Report of Marsha J. Courchane, Ph.D., supra note 116, at
1; Statement of Charges, supranote 105.
Countrywide Investigation, supra note 94, at 52.
Id. at53.
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investigation also found that black and Hispanic customers with high credit
scores were much more likely to receive subprime products.169
While the racial segregation of borrowers among lenders' different
channels and products may be a result of mergers, different divisions' marketing
plans, and other seemingly benign reasons, those reasons must meet the strict
test of business necessity if they are causing black and Hispanic borrowers to
pay higher rates than similarly qualified white borrowers. It is difficult to see
how such practices can be justified, particularly when a lender cannot explain
why minority borrowers are not referred internally to the division, channel, or
product with the best available terms. The absence of such a referral mechanism
or the mechanism's failure to overcome racial disparities could itself be a policy
or practice subject to disparate impact analysis. 170
E. Looking Behind "Legitimate" Variables: Validation of Risk-Based
PricingModels Based on Costs
Federal bank regulators examine banks on a regular basis to ensure their
safety and soundness but also to ensure compliance with fair lending laws. The
agencies have spelled out their approach to evaluating race discrimination issues
in a document called Interagency Fair Lending Examination Procedures
(Examination Procedures).17 ' Although the Examination Procedures call for
consideration of whether a risk-based pricing system is "empirically based and
statistically sound,"' 7 2 it is far from clear that the agencies have actually
required lenders to justify their risk-based pricing models. It appears instead that
regulators seek evidence of discretionary pricing and then examine whether
factors used in pricing are "non-discriminatory." 17 So long as the lender is not
granting pricing discretion to loan officers and can articulate a
nondiscriminatory basis for the factors used in its pricing formula or matrix, it
appears unlikely that federal regulators will look behind the matrix.
As Ian Ayres has pointed out, there are two very different versions of the
business necessity test used to evaluate policies that burden minorities. 7 4 A

169. Id.at54.
170. Cf FED. FIN. INSTS. EXAMINATION COUNCIL, supra note 84, at21-22 (describing how
to testlender policies for steering to determine whether loan officers direct credit applicants to
higher priced products but making no reference to policies to steer applicants athigh cost divisions
to other divisions or products with more favorable terms, or "referring up").
171. Id.at1-2.
172. Id.at8.
173. See Hearing, supra note 77, at 43 (statement of Calvin R. Hagins, Director for
Compliance Policy, Office ofthe Comptroller ofthe Currency).
174. See Ayres, supra note 156, at670-71 (suggesting either that "any policy that is not
strictly
necessary to prevent a firm's bankruptcy is not justified" under the business necessity test
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lender could justify a mortgage-pricing model by a demonstrated relationship
between the pricing factor and increased defaults and credit losses (i.e., lender
costs). Alternatively, higher rates may be a product of market failures such as
lack of bargaining power among minority homebuyers, disparities in the
information level of minority consumers, or resulting price discrimination by
brokers. While the price disparities in both cases result from the operation of the
market, profitability that results from market failure should not be regarded as a
business necessity or justification for policies with a disparate impact. Business
necessity in the truest sense should be limited to cost-based pricing policies and
should exclude price adjustments that exploit market failures. 75
Let us return to the example of the common interest rate increment for
"small" loans: adding one-half of a percentage point to the rate for mortgages
below $75,000.176 There could be two possible explanations for this. It may be
that, even controlling for the loan-to-value ratio and credit score separately,
smaller loans result in higher defaults or higher losses on default than larger
loans. On the other hand, it may be that borrowers seeking smaller loans have
fewer options and are willing to pay higher rates, or conversely, it may be that
borrowers seeking larger loans are more willing to shop around for lower rates
and lenders take advantage of this. The profitability of the small loan markup
can be regarded as justified in the first case but not in the second.
While subprime price matrices have a superficial aura of validity, there is
little if any evidence that each of the components that go into a homeowner's
final APR is separately and validly tied to a risk-based cost incurred by the
lender. The small loan rate markup of 50 basis points is typical.177 It is
intuitively understood that smaller loans are more expensive for lenders for two
reasons: (1) fixed origination costs represent a larger percentage of smaller
loans, and (2) smaller loans may have worse loss severities in the event of
default and foreclosure because some foreclosure costs are also fixed and do not
vary with loan size.78 However, most rate matrices also separately increment
the interest rate for high loan-to-value ratios. 179 It may be that mortgages with
smaller amounts have greater origination costs and foreclosure loss severities
because they are more likely to also represent a larger percentage of the
property value; in other words, homeowners with smaller loans may have less
equity. Moreover, the fact that smaller loans may produce higher costs, even

or "that any policy that increases a firm's profitability (even infinitesimally) is justified" under the
business necessity test).
175. See id. at 669.
176. See discussion supra Part lI.B.
177. See White, supra note 79, at 514.
178. See Joseph A. Smith, Jr., Savings for the Poor: The Hidden Benefits of Electronic
Banking: A Review and Response, 5 N.C. BANKING INST. 1, 15 (2001).
179. See, e.g., White, supranote 79, at 511 tbl.2 (displaying multifactored interest rates).
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independently of the loan-to-value ratio, does not per se justify any price
increment a lender might impose. To properly justify the 80
small loan markup,
lenders need to validate its magnitude, not just its existence.
The interdependence of loan-to-value ratios and loan amounts is one of
several examples of ways in which lenders may double-count cost factors in
their interest rate models. In order to truly validate all the components of a rate
matrix, one would need to run regression analyses using all the pricing variables
and measure their independent effect on the lender's cost (origination and credit
losses) as the outcome variables.
If the 2007-2008 subprime meltdown demonstrated anything, it
demonstrated that the subprime mortgage industry had done a poor job of
assessing default risk and the future cost of losses for different groups of
mortgage loans. Lenders progressively took on greater and greater risks, mostly
in the design of mortgage products; examples include loans made without any
documentation of income, loans with payments of interest only or even negative
amortization, loans with no borrower down payment or equity, and loans with
escalating monthly payments. Although in the previous decade subprime
lending had been quite profitable and showed evidence of excessive pricing in
relation to risk, subprime mortgages made in 2006 and 2007 resulted in huge
risks of foreclosure losses that lenders clearly did not anticipate or price
correctly. 181
The justification for risk-based pricing is that lenders can validly determine
how their costs vary depending on the characteristics of each borrower and loan,
and lenders can then calibrate their interest rates and fees precisely to recover
those different risk-based costs. 182 Recent experience shows how poorly
subprime mortgage lenders calibrated risk and pricing. 183
In light of this experience, it seems unlikely that subprime interest rates
have been or can be correlated to future losses in any reliable and precise way.
In that case, the entire premise of risk-based pricing is suspect. In order to truly
justify charging some mortgage borrowers more than others, a lender would
need to demonstrate, using empirical results for actual costs of originating and
collecting mortgages and controlling properly for all variables, that it has
strictly tied its pricing model and adjustments to costs and that these elements
are not simply exploiting vulnerable and poorly informed consumers.

180. See id. at 512, 513-14 (discussing evidence as to whether risk-based pricing is truly
based on, and commensurate with, risk-related costs).
181. See Yuliya S. Demyanyk & Otto Van Hemert, Understanding the Subprime Mortgage
Crisis 1 (Dec. 5, 2008) (unpublished manuscript, available at http://ssrn.com/abstract- 1020396).
182. See White, supra note 79, at 508.
183. See, e.g., John P. Relman, Foreclosures, Integration, and the Future of the Fair
Housing Act, 41 IND. L. REV. 629, 634-36 (2008) (discussing how technology allowed for lenders
to predict risk and pricing and allowed for the emergency of subprime lending).
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Regulators should also require lenders using various credit factors to
explain pricing differences to show that they actually used the explanatory
factors to set prices. An expert may be able, after the fact, to "explain" racial
price differences based on variables that correlate with race and appear to have
some business justification but were not a variable used in the price matrix.
Courts generally view this form of after-the-fact rationalization of disparate
impacts as pretextual in the employment discrimination context. 1 4 To take an
example from Walker, 18 5 Dr. Courchane found that home improvement and
refinance loans were priced higher than purchase money mortgages. 186 If the
Wells Fargo price matrix did not differentiate its pricing between those loan
types, then a court ought not to consider this explanatory variable a legitimate
nondiscriminatory basis to explain higher rates paid by blacks that the lender
actually used.
Thus, a robust review of risk-based pricing must ask at least the following
questions:
1. Is each separate price adjustment independently validated based on
credit loss or other lender costs independently associated with that
adjustment variable, or are correlated risk factors being double-counted
in the pricing model?
2. Is the magnitude of a particular price differential associated with a
particular credit variable (e.g., credit score) demonstrably
commensurate with the costs associated with differences in that
variable among borrowers and loans?
3. Are post hoc explanations of pricing differences based on factors that
the lender actually used in setting loan prices initially?
V.

CONCLUSION: EXPLAINING AWAY DISCRIMINATION OR DOING SOMETHING
ABOUT IT?

The fact that lenders can cite various reasons to explain why they charge
minority borrowers more does not mean the reasons are good ones or that the
reasons should shield lenders from fair lending enforcement. The stakes for
minority mortgage borrowers are high, and the consequences of price
discrimination are far-reaching.
Fair lending laws and agency enforcement protocols must respond to the
more subtle but invidious mechanisms of the new price discrimination. The

184. See St. Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 523-24 (1993).
185. See supra Part IV.B.
186. See Supplemental Rebuttal Report of Marsha J. Courchane, Ph.D., supra note 116, at
app.4 tbl. 17.
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three major determinants of the tax for borrowing while black (or brown) are all
proper targets for antidiscrimination law. The delegation of pricing authority to
mortgage brokers, like the loan markup practices of the auto finance industry,
can and should be challenged. If the necessity of granting this power to
discriminate to brokers is based on lenders' need to gain market share by
relying on brokers who exploit borrower information problems and other market
failures, the law should not accept such practices as justified by business
necessity. Likewise, the proliferation of different lender divisions and loan
product designations that segregate minority borrowers into high priced loans
should not be tolerated, absent legitimate, validated cost-based differences
between the loan products. Finally, fair lending law needs to look behind the
seemingly respectable faqade of risk-based pricing itself to pose the
fundamental question of whether it is reasonably possible to price discriminate
among mortgage applicants in the economic sense without discriminating in a
fair lending sense.
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